CEO inside debt and the acquisition of private targets

Abstract

Abstract We find a strong positive association between the inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) of CEOs and announcement‐period abnormal returns (CARs) of acquiring firms bidding for private targets. In addition, gains to acquirers with high inside debt persist for at least 3 years post‐acquisition. Further analyses suggest that our results are largely driven by firms with lower levels of manager‐shareholder agency conflicts as proxied by higher transparency in firm activities, presence of a less powerful CEO, or presence of stronger monitoring. Our results are robust to an array of sensitivity tests.

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