The Conceptual Format Debate and the Challenge from (Global) Supramodality

Abstract

The primary aim of the paper is to take a fresh look at the debate between amodal and grounded (modality-specific) theories of conceptual representations by formulating what I call the challenge from (global) supramodality. The challenge proceeds from the observation that, in recent years, many neuroscience data suggest that extensive portions of what are tra ditionally considered modality-specific cortices are in fact supramodal in nature, that is, they can process external information independently from the perceptual modality. According to a strong or global interpretation of these data, the entire brain has a task-specific and sensory independent organisation. Within this extreme view, the traditional distinction between modality-specific and amodal representations loses much of its sense. The paper aims to explore the implications of (global) supramodality for the debate on the conceptual format. I shall argue that none of the (few) attempts to deal with this issue is ultimately successful, so the challenge remains unsolved.

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