The Ethics of Sex Robots

Abstract

Abstract What, if anything, is wrong with having sex with a robot? For the sake of this chapter, we will assume that sexbots are ‘mere’ machines that are reliably identifiable as such, despite their human-like appearance and behaviour. Under these stipulations, sexbots themselves can no more be harmed, morally speaking, than your dishwasher. However, there may still be something wrong about the production, distribution, and use of such sexbots. In this chapter, we examine whether sex with robots is intrinsically or instrumentally wrong and critically assess different regulatory responses. We defend a harm reduction approach to sexbot regulation, analogous to the approach that has been considered in other areas, concerning, for example, drugs and sex work.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 12 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.