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Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis
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  • 2010EPISTEMIC ANXIETY AND ADAPTIVE INVARIANTISM152 cited
  • 2020The relationship between belief and credence147 cited
  • 2017Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy144 cited
  • 2015Beliefs, buses and lotteries: Why rational belief can’t be stably high credence98 cited
  • 2012Outright Belief98 cited
  • 2018How do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?95 cited
  • 2019Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain89 cited
  • 2022Thinking, Guessing, and Believing53 cited
  • 2016Belief without credence52 cited
  • 2011Varieties of Bayesianism48 cited
  • 2019Unsettled Thoughts48 cited
  • 2019How Do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?45 cited
  • 2022Ignorance and Moral Responsibility42 cited
  • 2015Uncertainty Without All the Doubt39 cited
  • 2021The rationality of epistemic akrasia36 cited
  • 2012Fallibilism36 cited

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