The Democratic Accountability of Central Banks: A Comparative Study of the European Central Bank

Abstract

Part 1 Introduction: context objective approach structure. Part 2 Democratic accountability and central bank independence and theoretical background: central bank independence - the evaluation of central bank independence, conclusions the democratic accountability of central banks - the case for democratic accountability, defining democratic accountability for central banks, conclusions on the relationship between central bank independence and democratic accountability. Part 3 The central banks - an overview: Bank of England - historic development, institutional structure, tasks Banque de France - historic development, institutional structure, tasks Deutsche Bundesbank - historic development, institutional structure, tasks De Nederlandsche Bank NV - historic development, institutional structure, tasks the European system of central banks and the European Central Bank: historic development, institutional structure, tasks the Reserve Bank of New Zealand - historic development, institutional structure, tasks Federal Reserve system - historic development, institutional structure, tasks. Part 4 Evaluating the democratic accountability of central banks: legal bias - constitutional recognition of central banks, act of parliament, a constitutional recognition of member states' central banks in ESCB? monetary objectives - central banks with an indistinct monetary objective central banks with a primary monetary objective, central banks with a statutory quantified monetary objective the relationship with the executive branch of government - central bank statutes with an explicit reference to independence, central bank statues without an explicit reference to independence appointment and dismissal procedures - appointment and reappointment, dismissal override-mechanism - central bank systems precluding an override mechanism, the limited override mechanism of the Bundesbank, central bank systems incorporating a full override mechanism relationship with parliament - institutionalised relationship between the central bank and parliament, central banks without an institutionalised relationship with parliament transparency - transparency in the decision-making procedures of the central banks, transparency through publicity budgetary accountability - budgetary independence, limited budgetary independence. Part 5 Democratic accountability - quo vadis?: conditions for democratic accountability - introducing a yardstick, creating an arena instruments of democratic accountability - threat of change - the constraining effect of the legal basis, collegiate principle v. personal responsibility - the (re-) appointment and dismissal procedures, the stick behind the back - the override mechanism, checking where the money goes -budgetary accountability the status quo and the future of the democratic accountability of the ECB - the subsidiary role of democratic accountability, a new approach for a democratically accountable ECB (Part Contents).

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