Crafting accountability policy: Designing offices of inspector general

Abstract

Abstract Offices of Inspectors General (OIGs) promise increased accountability from governmental actors. OIGs do so by monitoring governmental programs and operations and providing their findings to legislative or executive decision makers and/or the public. These offices have enjoyed a particular popularity in the United States in the last 40 years; however a close examination of these OIGs demonstrates that, particularly on the state and local levels, there is vast variation in their designs. Using both original qualitative and quantitative data this paper examines the extent to which OIGs on the state and local levels vary from an archetypal OIG. The paper demonstrates that while design variations occur as the new institution is adopted in new places, sometimes deviations from the archetype are attributable to an intentional effort, based on a recognition of and reaction to the potential power of an OIG structured according to a theoretically ideal model, to restrict the office in ways that have the potential to undercut effectiveness.

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