Physicians as criminal defendants: Specialty, sanctions, and status liability.

Abstract

Contrary to the commonly held notion that high occupational status shields a deviant individual from sanctions, some theorists have proposed a negative relationship between punishment and status when the offending behavior is of low to moderate seriousness, but a positive relationship when it is of high seriousness. This phenomenon has been termed “status liability,” and previous research suggests that physicians are especially vulnerable to its effect. The present study examines status liability in terms of diverse medical specialties to determine whether status differences among specialists produce measurably different public reactions to deviance. Results follow the pattern predicted by the status liability hypothesis. The findings also suggest policy implications in such judicial areas as voir dire, Medicaid, fraud enforcement, and malpractice litigation.

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