A DIRECT REALISTIC ALTERNATIVE TO THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPTION OF MEMORY

Abstract

In this paper we criticize the commonly accepted theory of memory, and offer an alternative. According to the traditional view, memory is a stored men tal representation of things past. We show, through an analysis of a single act of recognition, the logical oddities to which this view leads. Since, however, these are generally ignored, we also consider those characteristics of the traditional view which apparently make it attractive to those who hold it, namely its con sonance with the commonly held conception of time, its explanation for the fallibility of memory, and its way of making behavior predictable. We then pre sent the alternative view, the direct realist theory. According to it, there is no such thing as a stored mental representation. The theory redefines memory as the perception of sequential structure, and in so doing successfully treats of the fallibility of memory and the necessity for making behavior predictable. More over, and perhaps most importantly, it does not lead to the logical difficulties of the traditional theory.

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