Nondeterminacy and Reasonable Choice

Abstract

This chapter outlines some of the implications of nondeterminacy, however it is explained, for rational choice. The chapter demonstrates that when nondeterminacy is present, some decision strategies actualize dynamic choice problems and resolutional remainder, while others violate basic requirements of rationality, such as basic contraction consistency and acyclicity. It is hypothesized that clues as to which reasons admit of nondeterminacy and how they do this can be found by studying the challenges that nondeterminacy poses for choice theory. Arguably, when otherwise acceptable decision strategies violate basic requirements of rationality because of nondeterminacy, reasons cannot admit of it. Three possible explanations of how to account for this are outlined.

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