Negative or Negated, Thus True? An Investigation of Concept Valence and Semantic Negation as Drivers of Framing Effects in Judgments of Truth

Abstract

The negativity bias in judgments of truth holds that content-wise identical statements are more likely to be judged as true when presented in a negative compared to positive concept frame. This article investigates the mechanisms underlying this concept frame effect by differentiating concept valence (something good versus bad) and semantic negation (grammatical operator) throughout five studies. We found some evidence that concept valence and semantic negation work in tandem to produce the concept frame, yet negation seems to be the more stable driver. Moreover, we found that negation exerts its impact on perceived truth by increasing the realm of possible states in which a specific statement can be true. Together, the present findings extend knowledge of the negativity bias in truth judgments by providing a more fine-grained picture of “negativity” and an explanation for why negation might be especially effective in increasing truth judgments.

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