Stronger attentional biases can be linked to higher reward rate in preferential choice

Abstract

When attention is biased to a particular option during information search preceding preferential choice, this option is often more likely to be chosen-even if its value is objectively lower than that of the alternative. This article demonstrates that although attentional biases-even to lower-valued options-may reduce accuracy (the tendency to choose the highest-valued option), they can increase reward rate (the amount of reward obtained per unit of time invested in the choice). To achieve a higher reward rate it is often preferable to choose a lower-valued option quickly rather than spend time trying to identify the highest-valued option. Attentional biases are typically associated with faster choices, and in terms of reward rate, this reduction in response time can often compensate for the accompanying decrease in accuracy. This relationship between attention, response time, and reward rate is modulated by features of the choice environment and by individual differences in choice boundaries and in the attentional amplification of evidence accumulation. These patterns are predicted theoretically by the attentional drift diffusion model (aDDM). A reanalysis of empirical data from several eye-tracking studies shows that these predicted patterns also hold empirically across various domains of preferential choice (riskless and risky choice, options of monetary rewards and of food items). It may therefore often be beneficial for decision makers to allocate their attention in a biased manner-that is, to deliberately ignore information on some options-in order to reduce the time cost of choice and thereby achieve a higher reward rate.

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