Fresh agricultural products supply chain coordination considering consumers' dual preferences under carbon cap-and-trade mechanism

Abstract

In order to achieve the goal of 'carbon neutral' development, under the conditions of carbon quota trading policy, consumers' preference for fresh agricultural products and low-carbon preference, this paper discusses the equilibrium decision-making problem of a two-level fresh agricultural products supply chain. And the cost sharing contract and the two-part pricing contract are introduced to coordinate the supply chain. The results show that: the fresh-keeping and low-carbon efforts made by fresh produce suppliers are related to consumers' preferences, fresh-keeping costs, low-carbon costs, fresh-keeping carbon emission factors, and carbon reduction efficiency; under certain conditions, both the cost sharing contract and the two-part pricing contract can coordinate the supply chain of fresh agricultural products; given certain costs and carbon reduction efficiency, which contract retailers choose depends on consumers' consumption preferences and the size of the supplier's initial carbon emissions; when both contracts are valid, it is more advantageous for the retailer to choose two-part pricing contract; the higher the carbon trading price, the better the incentive effect on suppliers' fresh-keeping efforts and low-carbon efforts.

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