A Fitting-Attitude Approach to Aesthetic Value?

Uriah Kriegel

25 citations0/0 files storedThe British Journal of Aesthetics

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Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art Philosophical Ethics and Theory Art, Aesthetics, and Perception

Abstract

Abstract It is a noteworthy disanalogy between contemporary ethics and aesthetics that the fitting-attitude account of value, so prominent in contemporary ethics, sees comparatively little play in aesthetics. The aim of this paper is to articulate what a systematic fitting-attitude-style framework for understanding aesthetic value might look like. In the bulk of the paper, I sketch possible fitting-attitude-style accounts of three central aesthetic values—the beautiful, the sublime, and the powerful—so that the general form of the framework comes through.

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1994Value in ethics and economics 1959Aesthetic Concepts 2000Sentiment and Value 1964The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude 1969The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong 1989Brentano and Intrinsic Value.2012Fittingness: The Sole Normative Primitive 2016Fittingness First

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