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Let F be a fact in virtue of which an agent, s , is blameworthy for performing an act of A -ing. We argue for the following three theses (with slight qualification of the first): ( Reason ) F is (at some time) a reason for s to feel guilty (to some extent) for A -ing; ( Desert ) s ’s having this reason suffices for s ’s deserving to feel guilty for A -ing; and ( Ground ) what grounds s ’s deserving to feel guilty for A -ing is simply what grounds that feeling’s being a fitting response by s to her A -ing. In light of these theses, we address several claims that have been made regarding responsibility and desert. We take issue with the divorce of desert from responsibility. We find acceptable a claim regarding blameworthiness and reason to induce guilt, and we defend the idea that it is non-instrumentally good that one who is blameworthy be subject to a fitting feeling of guilt. Finally, we argue against a view on which desert of blame has a teleological dimension.
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