Abstract This book explores the phenomenon of informal international organizations. These bodies are involved in governing many of the most important issues the world currently faces, and differ significantly from the highly legalized, formal organizations the world has traditionally relied on. But despite their evident importance, they remain poorly understood. This book develops a new approach to thinking about these puzzling institutions, presents new data revealing their extraordinary growth over time, and develops a novel theory about why states are creating them. The theory explains how states form preferences over the informality of international organization and how legal designs get chosen through often contentious bargaining processes. This theory of institutional design then informs a more dynamic account of the rise of informality. This account explains how major shifts occurring in the domestic political arenas of powerful states—especially growing polarization and the rise of the regulatory state—have been projected outward and reshaped the legal foundations of global governance. The book systematically tests this theory, quantitatively and qualitatively, and presents detailed accounts of the forces behind some of the most important institutions in the global economy. It concludes with an analysis of the effectiveness of informal organizations, finding that many are likely to be less capable of addressing the complex challenges the world presently confronts.
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