No open-access location is known for this record yet.
No open-access location is known for this record yet.
ABSTRACT This paper develops a theory of strategic trading in markets with large arbitrageurs. If arbitrageurs are not well capitalized, capital constraints make their trades predictable. Other market participants can exploit this by trading against them. Competitors may find it optimal to lend to arbitrageurs that are financially fragile; additional capital makes the arbitrageurs more viable, and lenders can reap profits from trading against them for a longer time. The strategic behavior of these market participants has implications for the functioning of financial markets. Strategic trading may produce significant price distortions, increase price manipulation, and trigger forced liquidations of large traders.
Loading…
Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 68 citations exist upstream.
Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.
Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.