In an approach to vagueness using the paraconsistent logic LP, borderline cases of vague predicates are contradictory — logical gluts.1 In ‘Finding Tolerance without Gluts’ (Beall 2014),2 Jc Beall argues against such an account of vagueness. He constructs an alternative theory, and argues that ‘[t]he result enjoys all the virtues of the LP solution but without the gluts’ (p. 794). He concludes that his alternative is therefore preferable to the LP solution. In what follows, we will demonstrate that this is not the case: Beall’s account does not do all the things that a paraconsistent solution can do. In fact, it is the other way around: the paraconsistent account can do everything that Beall’s theory can do, and more. And some of the ‘more’ is very important. We will demonstrate this by discussing each of the three objections to his own project which Beall raises and rejects (Sects 4.1, 4.3, 4.5), arguing that his replies fail in each case.
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