Do Connectionist Representations Earn Their Explanatory Keep?

William Ramsey

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Philosophy and Theoretical Science Philosophy and History of Science Categorization, perception, and language

Abstract

Abstract:In this paper I assess the explanatory role of internal representations in connectionist models of cognition. Focusing on both the internal‘hidden’units and the connection weights between units, I argue that the standard reasons for viewing these components as representations are inadequate to bestow an explanatorily useful notion of representation. Hence, nothing would be lost from connectionist accounts of cognitive processes if we were to stop viewing the weights and hidden units as internal representations.

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1984Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories 1988Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A critical analysis 1987Psychosemantics 1984Computation and Cognition 1988Explaining Behavior 1980Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology 1989Biosemantics 1989Meaning and Mental Representation

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2005How do connectionist networks compute?2016Bayesian Perception Is Ecological Perception 2002Passionate Engines 2008The role of representation in computation

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