Mental Properties

Abstract

HE identity thesis, let us agree, is the doctrine that every mental property (e.g., being in pain) is identical to a firstorder physical property (e.g., having firing C-fibers).Prevailing opinion seems to be that the identity thesis is false.The most popular arguments for this opinion are the multiple-realizability argument and the Nagel-Jackson knowledge argument.I shall try to show that these arguments are unsatisfactory as they stand and that their problems are incurable.For better arguments, opponents of the identity thesis must look to the history of philosophy, specifically to two closely related arguments traceable to the writings of Rene Descartes-the modal argument and the certainty argument.Although these arguments are also unsatisfactory as they stand, I shall try to show that (unlike their more fashionable cousins) they can be successfully reformulated.But for a refutation of the identity thesis in its full generality, they will need to be woven together into a single new argument.A unifying theme of the paper is that each of the four arguments is plagued by doubts that originate in scientific essentialism (SE), the doctrine that there are a posteriori necessities (e.g., water = H 2 0).If SE suitably generalizes beyond physical property identities, each of the four arguments is at best inconclusive.True, Saul Kripke has tried to save the modal argument from this kind of aggressive SE, but I shall argue that his defense (and much of the discussion of it) is misconceived.I.

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