Replacing Truth

Kevin A. Scharp

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophy and Theoretical Science Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge

Abstract

Scharp proposes an account of the nature and logic of truth, in which truth is an inconsistent concept that should be replaced for certain theoretical purposes. He argues that truth is best understood as an inconsistent concept; develops an axiomatic theory of truth and offers a kind of possible-worlds semantics for this theory.

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