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Soft Shareholder Activism
16 references·1 citing·36 second hop
Soft Shareholder Activism (2012)Soft Shareholder ActivismActive Ownership (2015)Active OwnershipThe “Wall Street Walk” and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice (2009)The “Wall Street Walk” and Sh…Blockholder Trading, Market Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia (2009)Blockholder Trading, Market E…Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance (2008)Hedge Fund Activism, Corporat…Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade‐Off between Liquidity and Control? (1998)Large Shareholders as Monitor…Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm (1997)Large Shareholders, Monitorin…Large Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing, and Financial Market Equilibrium (1994)Large Shareholder Activism, R…The hidden costs of stock market liquidity (1993)The hidden costs of stock mar…Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring (1993)Market Liquidity and Performa…Liquidity versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor (1991)Liquidity versus Control: The…Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior (1989)Efficient Capital Markets, In…Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia (1988)Takeover Threats and Manageri…Large Shareholders and Corporate Control (1986)Large Shareholders and Corpor…Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading (1985)Continuous Auctions and Insid…Strategic Information Transmission (1982)Strategic Information Transmi…Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. (1970)Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Resp…Governance and Comovement Under Common Ownership (2014)Governance and Comovement Und…Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers (1986)A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997)The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets: Divisional Rent‐Seeking and Inefficient Investment (2000)Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors (2016)American Economic Review (2019)Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments (1988)The Association between Outside Directors, Institutional Investors and the Properties of Management Earnings Forecasts (2005)Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation (1980)The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences (1985)Financial Dependence and Growth (1996)Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence (2004)How does financial reporting quality relate to investment efficiency? (2009)Market structure, information, futures markets, and price formation. (1984)Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed traders (1985)Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets (1990)Investor Psychology and Security Market Under‐ and Overreactions (1998)Illiquidity and stock returns: cross-section and time-series effects (2002)Job Market Signaling (1973)Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have (1984)Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information (1985)The economic implications of corporate financial reporting (2005)Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control (1965)Law and Finance (1998)Corporate Ownership Around the World (1999)The Strategy of Conflict (1960)Reputation and imperfect information (1982)Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria (1987)Herd Behavior and Investment (1988)Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes (1994)Corporate governance proposals and shareholder activism: the role of institutional investors (2000)Corporate Governance and Equity Prices (2003)Corporate Governance, Product Market Competition, and Equity Prices (2011)Founding‐Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500 (2003)PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS OF PERSONAL ENGAGEMENT AND DISENGAGEMENT AT WORK. (1990)A National Customer Satisfaction Barometer: The Swedish Experience (1992)Organizational Images and Member Identification (1994)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1970Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States.11,220 cited
  • 1985Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading9,626 cited
  • 1986Large Shareholders and Corporate Control8,403 cited
  • 1982Strategic Information Transmission4,289 cited
  • 1989Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior2,585 cited
  • 1993Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring1,717 cited
  • 1988Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia1,670 cited
  • 1997Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm1,518 cited
  • 2008Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance1,510 cited
  • 1998Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade‐Off between Liquidity and Control?1,453 cited
  • 2009Blockholder Trading, Market Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia1,264 cited
  • 2015Active Ownership1,241 cited
  • 1993The hidden costs of stock market liquidity1,020 cited
  • 1991Liquidity versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor924 cited
  • 2009The “Wall Street Walk” and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice911 cited

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1994
Large Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing, and Financial Market Equilibrium
903 cited

Cited by

  • 2014Governance and Comovement Under Common Ownership11 cited