Willful Ignorance

Jan Willem Wieland

34 citations0/0 files storedEthical Theory and Moral Practice

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Philosophical Ethics and Theory Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies

Abstract

Michelle Moody-Adams suggests that “the main obstacle to moral progress in social practices is the tendency to widespread affected ignorance of what can and should already be known.” This explanation is promising, though to understand it we need to know what willful (affected, motivated, strategic) ignorance actually is. This paper presents a novel analysis of this concept, which builds upon Moody-Adams ( 1994 ) and is contrasted with a recent account by Lynch ( 2016 ).

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2006Incentives and Prosocial Behavior 2006Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness 2010Why don't consumers consume ethically?2007Why People Don’t Take their Concerns about Fair Trade to the Supermarket: The Role of Neutralisation 2011DOES MORAL IGNORANCE EXCULPATE?2007Don’t Know, Don’t Kill: Moral Ignorance, Culpability, and Caution 2016Self-Image and Willful Ignorance in Social Decisions 1994Culture, Responsibility, and Affected Ignorance

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