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Transferable Control

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References

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1999The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I

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2003Complementarities and Substitutabilities in Franchise Contracting: Some Results from the German Franchise Sector28 cited
2009Employment relationships in knowledge‐based firms: Who should have power?12 cited
2012When Does Adaptation Require Decentralization?6 cited