Silent Reference

Abstract

By separating constitutive, epistemic, and aetiological determination, the need for an intention-based theory of reference and the irrelevance of context to the constitution of reference can both be established. In “Indexicals and the Theory of Reference” (1981), Schiffer analyses speaker reference in terms of speaker meaning: S refers to o in uttering x just in case, in uttering x, S means an o-dependent proposition. This paves the way for an analysis of referring to o by way of (occurrence) i of (expression) e in x. But S may refer to o though there is no phonic expression (perhaps no expression at all) in x by which S refers to o. Since the analyses attribute complex propositional attitudes to speakers (regarding expression occurrences and their properties), if there are aphonic referring expressions it seems to require attributing to speakers knowledge of such expressions and their properties. But it is doubtful ordinary speakers possess such knowledge. This creates a serious problem for both intention-based theories of reference and the postulation of aphonic referring expressions.

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