Higher‐Order Theories of Consciousness

Abstract

Higher-order theories purport to account for the conscious character of such states in terms of higher-order representations. This chapter focuses on three classes of higher-order theory of phenomenal consciousness, including inner-sense theory, actualist higher-order thought theory, and dispositionalist higher-order thought theory. All three of these higher-order theories purport to offer reductive explanations of phenomenal consciousness. Inner-sense theory has important positive virtues, but faces problems; whereas actualist higher-order thought theory avoids those problems, but at the cost of losing the positive virtues. Actualist higher-order thought theory has the advantage that no special organs or mechanisms need to be postulated. Dispositionalist higher-order thought theory claims to split the difference, providing an account that has all of the advantages of inner-sense theory with none of the flaws. The success of dispositionalist higher-order thought theory is premised upon the existence of dual analog contents.

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