Abstract On Virtue Ethics is an exposition and defence of neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics. The first part discusses the ways in which it can provide action guidance and action assessment, which are usually given by the v‐rules—rules generated from the names of the virtues and vices such as ‘Do what is honest’, ‘Do not do what is dishonest’. That such rules may (apparently) conflict, leads to an exploration of the virtue ethics approach to resolvable, irresolvable, and tragic dilemmas. The second part is about the role of the emotions in virtue and vice, since it examines the inculcation of racism through the miseducation of the emotions. Kant and Aristotle are compared on the question of moral motivation, and a virtue ethics’ account of acting ‘from a sense of duty’ provided. The third part is on ‘the rationality of morality’ in relation to virtue ethics, the question of whether there is any ‘objective’ criterion for a certain character trait being a virtue. The standard neo‐Aristotelian premise that ‘A virtue is a character trait a human being needs for eudaimonia, to flourish or live well’ should be regarded as encapsulating two interrelated claims, namely, that the virtues benefit their possessor, and that the virtues make their possessor good qua human being (human beings need the virtues in order to live a characteristically good human life.) The second claim is defended in terms of a form of ethical naturalism—the enterprise of basing ethics in some way on considerations of human nature—but a form that explicitly disavows any pretensions to being purely scientific.
Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 148 citations exist upstream.
Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.