Article2001

Is Structural Realism Possible?

100 citations0/0 files storedPhilosophy of Science

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Philosophy and History of Science Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophy, Science, and History

Abstract

This paper examines in detail two paths that lead to Structural Realism (SR), viz. a substantive philosophical position which asserts that only the structure of the world is knowable. The upward path is any attempt to begin with empiricist premises and reach a sustainable realist position. (It has been advocated by Russell, Weyl, and Maxwell among others.) The downward path is any attempt to start from realist premises and construct a weaker realist position. (It has been recently advocated by Worrall, French, and Ladyman.) This paper unravels and criticizes the metaphysical presuppositions of both paths to SR. It questions its very possibility as a substantive—and viable—realist thesis.

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References

1980The Scientific Image 1956Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science 1999Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth 1989Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds?2007The logical structure of the world 1971The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories 1985Critical Notice: Bertrand Russell's The Analysis of Matter: Its Historical Context and Contemporary Interest

Cited by

2010The interdependence of structure, objects and dependence 2006VI*-STRUCTURE AS A WEAPON OF THE REALIST1 2006Realism about Structure: The Semantic View and Nonlinguistic Representations 2017Ontic Structural Realism 2006Shared structure need not be shared set-structure 2006Ramseyfication and Theoretical Content 2011Do Objects Depend on Structures?2004Structuralism as a form of scientific realism

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