The Secret Connexion

Abstract

Abstract According to the regularity theory of causation, all there is to causation is regular succession. On this view, for A to be the cause of B is just for all things of type A to be followed by things of type B: there is absolutely nothing about A that gives rise to B or makes B happen, there is no reason in the nature of things for the regularity that we encounter, nothing ever influences anything else in any way. The standard view of David Hume is that he endorses this view and rejects the idea of causal power. The central historical claim of this book is that this is wrong. There is no evidence that this ‘ontological’ regularity theory of causation ever occurred to Hume. Nor does it follow from his empiricist theory of meaning. In fact he takes it for granted that there is something about reality—call this x—given which it is regular in the way that it is. In John Wright’s terms, Hume is a ‘sceptical realist’ about X. His fundamental claim about x is the epistemological claim that while of course x exists, we can’t know its nature; we can’t form any sort of positive, empirically legitimate conception of its nature. Nor can any term that purports to refer to this something x have any clear and distinct or empirically legitimate descriptive meaning. The other main claim of the book is that the ontological regularity theory of causation is indefensible. There is a correct and straightforward answer to the question ‘why is reality regular in the way that it is?’ Assuming reality is material, the answer is: ‘because matter has a certain nature, and behaves as it does because it has the nature it has’. One can call this ‘natural necessity’.

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