Playing Double

Abstract

This chapter proposes a framework for thinking about implicit bias and how we can control it. It argues that systematic implicit bias is best thought of as a form of belief, which can conflict with the subject’s explicit beliefs. Explicit belief itself is identified with a kind of active acceptance, yielding a dual-level view of the human mind, in which a passive implicit level supports an active explicit one—a view that has close links with dual-process theory. The chapter then turns to self-control. If we are systematically biased, how can we form unbiased explicit beliefs and make them effective in action? The dual-level view offers novel answers, assigning a crucial role to certain metacognitive attitudes, which constitute what we call strength of will. The chapter sets out the conditions for deliberate override of implicit bias and outlines some predictions of the proposed account.

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