Costly Voting

Tilman Börgers

170 citations0/0 files storedAmerican Economic Review

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Game Theory and Voting Systems Game Theory and Applications Auction Theory and Applications

Abstract

What are good voting rules if voting is costly? We analyze this question for the case that an electorate chooses among two alternatives. In a symmetric private value model of voting we show that majority voting with voluntary participation Pareto-dominates majority voting with compulsory participation as well as random decision-making.

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References

1974The Paradox of Not Voting: A Decision Theoretic Analysis 1983A strategic calculus of voting 2003Committee Design with Endogenous Information

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2008Beliefs and Voting Decisions: A Test of the Pivotal Voter Model 2008Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?2007The performance of pivotal-voter models in small-scale elections: Evidence from Texas liquor referenda 2007Efficiency, Equity, and Timing of Voting Mechanisms 2011A STRUCTURAL MODEL OF TURNOUT AND VOTING IN MULTIPLE ELECTIONS 2012Voluntary voting: Costs and benefits 2010Equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions 2017What Makes Voters Turn Out: The Effects of Polls and Beliefs

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