Agencies on the loose? Holding government networks accountable

Abstract

An important but often overlooked mechanism of global governance is networks of national government officials working together on issues of common interest and concern. These "government networks" are particularly dense in a number of regulatory areas such as monetary policy, securities regulation, insurance regulation, competition policy, and environmental policy. While many welcome the growth of these networks under the banner of transnational regulatory cooperation, others perceive a threat of unaccountable technocracy ? agencies on the loose. This paper sets forth the accountability critique and then develops a number of responses, including increasing transparency through use of the Internet, increasing opportunity for participation in network activities, and distinguishing between real and perceived problems of accountability. In conclusion, the paper sets forth several general principles of transnational governance that would provide a baseline for regulating all transgovernmental activity.

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