Abstract What are the materials of conscious perceptual experience? What is going on when we are consciously aware of a visual scene, or hear sounds, or otherwise enjoy sensory experience? In The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience David Papineau exposes the flaws in contemporary answers to this central philosophical question and defends a new alternative. Contemporary theories of perceptual experience all hold that conscious experiences reach out into the world beyond the mind. According to naïve realism, experiences literally incorporate perceived facts, while representationalism holds that experiences contain ordinary properties of the kind possessed by physical objects. These ideas might seem attractive at first sight, but Papineau shows that they do not stand up to examination. Instead Papineau argues for a purely qualitative account of sensory experience. Conscious sensory experiences are intrinsic states of people with no essential connection to external circumstances or represented properties. This might run counter to initial intuition, but Papineau shows that it is the only view that fits the facts. He develops this qualitative theory in detail, showing how it can accommodate the rich structure of sensory experience. Papineau’s qualitative account has respectable antecedents in the history of philosophy, and is also probably the view adopted by most non-specialists, be they reflective high school students, practising neuroscientists, or philosophers working outside the philosophy of perception. By placing the qualitative theory on a firm footing, Papineau shows all those curious about experience that they need not be restricted to the options on the contemporary philosophical menu.
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