SZodixStudyAcademic Library
ShelvesOpen access
Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated
Some Historical Remarks on the Baconian Conception of Probability
0 references·16 citing·25 second hop
Some Historical Remarks on the Baconian Conception of Probability (1980)Some Historical Remarks on the Baconian C…Knightian Uncertainty Meets Ranking Theory (2017)Knightian Uncertainty Meets R…Intuition in Kahneman and Tversky’s Psychology of Rationality (2014)Intuition in Kahneman and Tve…Francis Bacon as a Precursor to Popper (1982)Francis Bacon as a Precursor …Who shall be the arbiter of our intuitions? (1981)Who shall be the arbiter of o…Unphilosophical probability (1981)Unphilosophical probabilityThe irrational, the unreasonable, and the wrong (1981)The irrational, the unreasona…Status of the rationality assumption in psychology (1981)Status of the rationality ass…Some questions regarding the rationality of a demonstration of human rationality (1981)Some questions regarding the …Rationality is a necessary presupposition in psychology (1981)Rationality is a necessary pr…Rationality and the sanctity of competence (1981)Rationality and the sanctity …On defining rationality unreasonably (1981)On defining rationality unrea…Lay arbitration of rules of inference (1981)Lay arbitration of rules of i…L. J. Cohen versus Bayesianism (1981)L. J. Cohen versus BayesianismInferential competence: right you are, if you think you are (1981)Inferential competence: right…Conditional probability, taxicabs, and martingales (1981)Conditional probability, taxi…“Is” and “ought” in cognitive science (1981)“Is” and “ought” in cognitive…Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes (1976)The Open Society and Its Enemies (2012)Popper: Conjectures and Refutations (2013)The Logic of Scientific Discovery (2013)ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF SYNTAX (1964)Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (1974)The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice (1981)On the Competence and Incompetence of Experts (2007)Motivational Reasons for Biased Decisions: The Sunk-Cost Effect’s Instrumental Rationality (2018)Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk (1979)Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk (1988)Psychology of Critical Decision-Making (2020)When Clarity Clouds the View: Introducing a Decision Style Framework for Assessing Task-Related Effectiveness in Analysis and Intuition (2025)Discrepancies between human behavior and formal theories of rationality: The incompleteness of Bayesian probability logic (1983)Norms, competence, and the explanation of reasoning* (1983)The rationality of the (lay) scientist: Toward reconciliation (1983)Resistance of personal risk perceptions to debiasing interventions. (1995)Mental Contamination and the Debiasing Problem (2002)Sympathetic Magical Thinking: The Contagion and Similarity “Heuristics” (2002)Arguments about Arguments (2005)Asymmetries in Argumentation and Evaluation (1992) (2005)The Positive versus the Negative Evaluation of Arguments (1994) (2005)Probabilities in the Courtroom: An Evaluation of the Objections and Policies (1992)How to reconsider the base rate fallacy without forgetting the concept of systematic processing (1996)Judgment under uncertainty: Evolution may not favor a probabilistic calculus (1996)
this work references cited by second hop

References

No references inside the corpus for this window.

Cited by

  • 1981Who shall be the arbiter of our intuitions?109 cited
  • 1981“Is” and “ought” in cognitive science93 cited
  • 1981L. J. Cohen versus Bayesianism56 cited
  • 1981Inferential competence: right you are, if you think you are53 cited
  • 1982Francis Bacon as a Precursor to Popper22 cited
  • 1981On defining rationality unreasonably21 cited
  • 2014Intuition in Kahneman and Tversky’s Psychology of Rationality19 cited
  • 1981The irrational, the unreasonable, and the wrong18 cited
  • 1981Conditional probability, taxicabs, and martingales17 cited
  • 1981Status of the rationality assumption in psychology16 cited
  • 1981Rationality and the sanctity of competence15 cited
  • 1981Unphilosophical probability15 cited
  • 2017Knightian Uncertainty Meets Ranking Theory12 cited
  • 1981Some questions regarding the rationality of a demonstration of human rationality4 cited
  • 1981Rationality is a necessary presupposition in psychology3 cited
  • 1981Lay arbitration of rules of inference

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work

3 cited