Narrow Bracketing in Effort Choices

Abstract

Many important economic outcomes result from the cumulative effects of smaller choices and events, so the best outcomes require, minimally, accounting for total outcomes so far.We formally show that narrow bracketing -the neglect of such accounting -is unidentified if and only if the willingness to pay for an option is constant across all single choice sets, unifying, extending, and generalizing prior results.We empirically document narrow bracketing in work choices in a pre-registered experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk: bracketing due to separate or combined choice presentations changes average reservation wages by 13-28%.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 0 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.