The way a network develops over time has implications for the advantage it provides. We find that oscillation between closure and brokerage enhances network advantage. By “network oscillation” we refer to a period of deep engagement in a group (closure), followed by a period of connecting across groups (brokerage), followed by deep engagement in a group, followed by brokering, and so on. For evidence, we distinguish four dimensions to network volatility (churn, variation, trend, and reversal), measure the dimensions with panel data on a population of bankers, then add the volatility measures to models predicting banker compensation from status and structural hole measures of network advantage. Network volatility is not associated with performance directly or indirectly—but for one exception: reversals indicate a banker oscillating between closure and brokerage, and that oscillation strongly enhances the performance association with network advantage (measured by status or access to structural holes). In fact, network advantage has no association with performance for bankers who maintain stable brokerage or closure. Our evidence is sufficient to support and illustrate performance contingent on network oscillation, but our data are limited. With an eye to future research, we discuss three mechanisms that could be responsible for the oscillation effect.
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