Thought as Internal Speech in Plato and Aristotle

Abstract

Scholars often assert that Plato and Aristotle share the view that discursive thought (dianoia) is internal speech (TIS).However, there has been little work to clarify or substantiate this reading.In this paper I show Plato and Aristotle share some core commitments about the relationship of thought and speech, but cash out TIS in different ways.Plato and Aristotle both hold that discursive thinking is a process that moves from a set of doxastic states to a final doxastic state.The resulting judgments (doxai) can be true or false.Norms govern these final judgments and, in virtue of that, they govern the process that arrives at those judgments.The principal norm is consistency.However, the philosophers differ on the source of this norm.For Plato, persuasiveness and accuracy ground non-contradiction because internal speech is dialogical.For Aristotle, the Principle of Non-Contradiction grounds a Doxastic Thesis (DT) that no judgment can contradict itself.For Aristotle, metaphysics grounds non-contradiction because internal speech is monological.Similarly, where possible, I translate the verb legein as 'speaking' and logos as 'statement' although the semantic range of logos in Greek is notoriously wide, sometimes requiring a different translation.In the first part of the paper, I show where Plato and Aristotle agree.Section 1 outlines the evidence in Plato's dialogues that thought and speech share the following formal features.4 Both are (i) processes, (ii) whose steps involve affirmation and combinations, (iii) the results of which can be false, and (iv) which are norm-governed.5 I will sometimes talk as if one version of TIS is 'Plato's view', but, for the purposes of this paper, I remain agnostic as to whether Plato held TIS in propria persona.Section 2 makes the parallel case for Aristotle.The second part of the paper shows how Plato and Aristotle differ on internal speech.In section 3, I argue that Plato understands internal speech dialogically, while, in section 4, that Aristotle understands internal speech monologically.Because of this difference, the philosophers cannot ground the noncontradiction norm in the same way.Section 5 explains how each philosopher does ground the norm.In the conclusion, I offer some tentative suggestions as to why Plato and Aristotle differ on the nature of internal speech.1 Thought and internal speech in Plato 4 Plato and Aristotle often suggest that thinking and speaking are of a kind: thinking is internal speaking while articulate speech is external speaking.For Plato, see: Tht.189e4-a10; Soph.263b3-5; Phlb.38c5-39a7, cited in (Long 2013, 113).Perhaps also Tim. 37b and Phdr.276a5-7.For Aristotle see: De Int.16b9-18, 23a32, 24b1; APo.76b25; DA 427b11-14, 428a22-24; De Sen. 437a4-17; Metaphysics Г.4, 1006b8-9; and EN 1139b15, 1142b13-14.5 Dianoia may have other features as well, on Plato's account.(Long 2013, 114) argues that dianoia is intellectual and careful, for example.In Plato we find the view that thought and speech are processes.During his discussion of 'other-judging' in the Theaetetus, Socrates establishes agreement on what dianoia is: (T1) (S) Very nice.But do you call thinking (διανοεῖσθαι) exactly what I call it?(T) What do you call it?(S) A talk (λόγος) which the soul carries on itself withitself about the things it examines.This I tell you in ignorance.For this is how it seems to me.The soul, when thinking (διανοουμένη) does nothing other than discuss (διαλέγεσθαι), asking itself questions and answering them, both affirming and denying.Whenever it first determines something, either sluggishly or sharply, then says the same thing and does not hesitate, we posit that as its judgment (δόξαν).So I, at least, call judging (δοξάζειν) speaking (λέγειν) and judgment (δόξαν) a statement (λόγος), not articulated to someone else, but in silence to oneself (Theaetetus 189e4-190a6).6 Socrates defines judgment (doxa) as a silent statement (logos).Most commentators hold that Socrates intends this definition literally.7 But there are extensional difficulties with the stated definition.8 First, some thoughts have no spoken analogue e.g. the thoughts an artist thinks while painting or a pianist while playing.Judgment is essential to these activities but the sorts of judgment needed to paint or play do not have an obvious linguistic equivalent.This is not just because the artist or the 6 My translation, based on Levett/Burnyeat.7 (Panaccio 1999, 33); (Sedley 2003, 1); (Sedley 2006, 129-30); (Lorenz 2006, 92).For the Socratic background of the conception of thought as silent dialogue, see (Sedley 2006, 129-30).8 For a specific concern that the norms of thought might be different from the norms of speech, see (Evans 2011, 347).

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