A Kantian Critique of Transparency

Abstract

Many contemporary philosophers have defended the ‘transparency’ thesis: How a subject answers the question of whether she believes that p is not by an inner glance; rather, that question is answered in the same way as the question of the truth of p. Several proponents (most prominently Gareth Evans) suggest that they take some of their inspiration for the thesis from Kant. By contrast, this chapter argues that Kant would have opposed the transparency thesis. His investigations into the necessary conditions for cognition show that only a self-conscious subject could have a belief. In that case, the base step for self-ascription, belief about the world, must already involve self-consciousness. Kant does not (at least at his better moments) think that subjects understand themselves as thinkers or believers through inner glances, but through engaging in rational thought.

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