Logical Luck

Abstract

Is guilt always part of the pain of contradiction? If I equivocate, is it always my fault? These issues about blame in logic (and perhaps the logic of blame) bear on central issues in philosophy of mind and language. One focus is the distinction between ignorance and incoherence drawn by Saul Kripke in his Pierre puzzle. The second focus is the challenge to privileged access mounted by Hilary Putnam in his twin earth ‘thought‐experiment’. I shall argue that some logical misdeeds are unavoidable. Often this lack of control excuses the misdeed. But not always – for reasons presaged by Bernard Williams in his discussion of moral luck.

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