Propositional Content

Abstract

Abstract This book defends a new theory about the nature of propositional content. According to this theory, the basic bearers of representational properties are particular mental or spoken actions. Propositions are types of these actions, which we use to classify and individuate our attitudes and speech acts. This theory abandons several key features of the traditional Fregean conception of propositional content, including the idea that propositions are the primary bearers of truth conditions, the distinction between content and force, and the concept of entertainment. The main difficulty for this traditional conception is the problem of the unity of the proposition, the problem of explaining how propositions have truth conditions and other representational properties. The theory developed in the book explains the unity of propositions and provides new solutions to a long list of puzzles and problems in philosophy of language.

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