Improbable Knowing

Timothy L. Williamson

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophy and Theoretical Science Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies

Abstract

Timothy Williamson describes an example which he takes to establish the possibility of knowledge in the presence of the extreme improbability to one that one knows. Prima facie, it seems such an example doesn't sit well with evidentialism, for then one's (total) evidence could support knowledge level justification for p, yet at the same time support the same level of justification for the proposition that you don't know.

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2013Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic 2015Respecting all the evidence 2013The puzzle of the unmarked clock and the new rational reflection principle 2020Conversational Pressure 2019Knowing Our Limits 2021Prejudice 2017Truth, knowledge, and the standard of proof in criminal law 2016DISAGREEMENT, DRUGS, ETC.: FROM ACCURACY TO AKRASIA

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