Law, Liberty, and Justice

Abstract

This book makes a fresh appraisal of the main principles of constitutional law, seeking to stimulate renewed debate about the fundamentals of British constitutionalism. Rejecting a purely formal concept of the rule of law, the book argues that public law should more fully and openly reflect the principles of liberty and justice which constitute the underlying point and substance of the rule of law. The connection between law and justice is ultimately secured by the primary role of the individual conscience in making judgements about what the law requires. And just as no court is ever an infallible arbiter of legal obligation — the individual may sometimes have to stand by his own conscientious reading of the law — Parliament cannot be accorded unqualified authority to change the law. The sovereignty of Parliament is necessarily limited by residual principles of liberal constitutionalism; any other view would contradict the rule of law. Standard comparisons between written and unwritten constitutions, and traditional accounts of the separation of powers, obscure more than they reveal. The interpretation and application of statutes must always be a matter of judicial deliberation and judgement, just as the application of government policies and administrative orders is ultimately subject to the requirements of justice in particular cases.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 146 citations exist upstream.