In search of the false-uniqueness phenomenon: Fear and estimates of social consensus.

Abstract

An examination of the social perception literature yields little evidence for the false-uniqueness phenomenon (Valins & Nisbett, 1972), the perception that one's attributes are more unique than is the case. In contrast, the tendency for individuals to project their own characteristics onto other people and assume that more people are like themselves is a robust phenomenon. One reason researchers may not have found false uniqueness is that they have not looked at the accuracy of consensus estimates. A close look at the results of Tabachnik, Crocker, and Alloy (1983) and Sanders and Mullen (1983), who did assess accuracy, suggests that people possessing undesirable attributes over-estimate consensus, whereas people holding desirable attributes underestimate consensus. The latter pattern is a form of false uniqueness. In this study we looked at the accuracy of social consensus estimates in the context of psychological fears. A sample of subjects filled out an abbreviated version of a fear survey and made estimates of consensus. The results showed that both high- and low-fear respondents overestimated the incidence of high fear among their peers, but high-fear subjects were more inaccurate in their estimates. A false-uniqueness effect was found on the part of low-fear subjects, as they tended to underestimate the incidence of low fear among their peers. These findings are consistent with a motivational interpretation that emphasizes the individual's need to justify or normalize stigmatized behavior and to bolster perceived self-competence.

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