This book offers a theory of practical reasoning which is Aristotelian in spirit, since it maintains that one can reason to action in very much the same ways as those in which one can reason to belief. But the book gives its own, non-Aristotelian account of what those ways are; the practical syllogism hardly appears at all. Instead, there are accounts of reasons as considerations favouring a certain response, and of other ways in which considerations can be relevant to that response. Practical reasoning involves the attempt to see how the different relevant considerations come together to favour responding in a certain way (understood here as the attempt to determine the practical shape of the situation) and in acting in that way, in the light of those considerations. The only difference between this and theoretical reasoning is that in the latter, the relevant response is a belief rather than an action. The ‘therefore’ that is involved on both sides is a ‘for these reasons’ sort of therefore. The book also shows how the account offered can make good sense of moral reasoning and of the special forms of practical reasoning that are instrumental.
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