Emotions and Reasons

Patricia S. Greenspan

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Philosophical Ethics and Theory Philosophy and Theoretical Science Emotions and Moral Behavior

Abstract

In Emotions and Reasons, Patricia Greenspan offers an evaluative theory of emotion that assigns emotion a role of its own in the justification of action. She analyzes emotions as states of object-directed affect with evaluative propositional content possibly falling short of belief and held in mind by generalized comfort or discomfort.

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