Abstract This book is an exploration of moral knowledge: its possibility, its sources, and its characteristic vulnerabilities. It addresses such questions as: what are the strengths and weaknesses of the method of reflective equilibrium as an account of how we should make up our minds about moral questions? What would count as evidence for or against a fundamental moral conviction? Are observation and testimony potential sources of moral knowledge? What, if anything, would be wrong with simply outsourcing your views about moral questions to a moral expert? How fragile is our knowledge of morality, compared to other kinds of knowledge? Does knowledge of the difference between right and wrong fundamentally differ from knowledge of other kinds in that it cannot be forgotten? To what extent are our moral views vulnerable to being “debunked” by empirical discoveries about why we hold them? What is the relationship between being able to justify a moral judgment and knowing that it is true? Should we invest more confidence in relatively abstract, general moral principles that strike us as true, or more confidence in our judgments about the rightness and wrongness of particular actions?
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