Anomalies: Cooperation

Robyn M. Dawes · Richard H. Thaler

624 citations0/0 files storedThe Journal of Economic Perspectives

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Game Theory and Voting Systems Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation

Abstract

Much economic analysis -- and virtually all game theory -- starts with the assumption that people are both rational and selfish. The predictions derived from this assumption of rational selfishness are, however, violated in many familiar contexts. In this column and the next one, the evidence from laboratory experiments is examined to see what has been learned about when and why humans cooperate. This column considers the particularly important case of cooperation vs. free riding in the context of public good provision.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 624 citations exist upstream.

References

1982Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma 1986On the private provision of public goods 1981Economists free ride, does anyone else?1984Divergent evidence on free riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations 1985Public goods provision in an experimental environment

Cited by

2000Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality 2003Explaining altruistic behavior in humans 2005Social Traps and the Problem of Trust 2005The Ethics of Care 1999Collective action as a social exchange 1999Landscape Design: Designing for Local Action in Complex Worlds 2004Decentralized targeting of an antipoverty program 2006Activation of social norms in social dilemmas: A review of the evidence and reflections on the implications for environmental behaviour

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.