The Reality of Consciousness

Abstract

This chapter presents the “big picture” approach of this book. It argues that the reality of consciousness is a datum in its own right, a starting point for metaphysical enquiry that sits alongside the data of observation and experiments. This perspective is defended against neuro-fundamentalism (the view that the only way to make progress in explaining consciousness is to do more neuroscience) and methodological naturalism (the view that we should look to—and only to—the third-person scientific method to tell us what reality is like). This partly involves attributing the success of the physical sciences to the fact that Galileo limited its domain of enquiry, by supposing that the sensory qualities are not in the physical world. Finally, the two views that are the focus of the book—physicalism and Russellian monsim—are introduced, and the main claims that will be made about them are articulated.

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