The European Stability Mechanism and the IMF: From the Enhanced Cooperation to Embedded Supervisor

Abstract

This paper examines the role played by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), finding that the ESM has greatly expanded the IMF’s surveillance and oversight roles in the European Monetary Union (EMU). Building from a liberal intergovernmental framework of integration analysis, this paper argues that the IMF’s function as a de facto EMU supervisor in the ESM, a significant break from prior European integration, stems from the alignment of crisis response preferences amongst the EMU’s largest economies, the erosion of the credibility of the European Commission as an enforcer of structural reforms, and the IMF’s close fit with the preferred institutional arrangements that derived from the bargaining dynamics between euro members.

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