War and Chance

Abstract

Abstract War and Chance analyzes the logic, psychology, and politics of assessing uncertainty in international affairs. It explains how the most important kinds of uncertainty in international politics are inherently subjective, and yet how scholars, practitioners, and pundits can still debate these issues in clear and structured ways. Altogether, the book shows how foreign policy analysts can assess uncertainty in a manner that is theoretically coherent, empirically meaningful, politically defensible, practically useful, and sometimes logically necessary for making sound choices. Each of these claims contradicts widespread skepticism about the value of probabilistic reasoning in international politics, and shows how placing greater emphasis on assessing uncertainty can improve nearly any kind of foreign policy analysis or decision. The book substantiates this argument by examining critical episodes in the history of U.S. national security policy, such as strategic planning in Vietnam, assessments of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs, and the search for Osama bin Laden. The book also draws on a diverse range of quantitative evidence, including a database containing nearly one million geopolitical forecasts and experimental studies involving hundreds of national security professionals.

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