Distinguishing “or” from “and” and the case for historical identification

Abstract

Abstract The adequacy of a probabilistic interpretation must be judged according to the nature of the event, or thing, being inferred. For example, conditional (frequency) probability is not admissible in the inference of phylogeny, because basic statements of common ancestry do not fulfill the requirements of the relations specified by the probability calculus. The probabilities of the situation peculiar to the time and place of origin of species are unique. Moreover, according to evolutionary theory, an event of species diversification is necessarily unique, because species are parts of a replicator continuum—species arise from ancestral species. Also, these probabilities cannot be ascertained, because the relevant situation cannot be repeated—it is unique. Finally, the applicability of conditional (frequency) probability is denied, because events of common ancestry have already occurred—there is nothing to predict. However, hypotheses of species relationships can be identified objectively according to the degree to which they have survived simultaneous testing with critical evidence, not with generally confirming evidence. The most parsimonious hypothesis of species relationships represents the least disconfirmed, best supported, proposition among the alternatives being compared. That hypothesis does not, however, deserve any special epistemological status beyond serving as the focus of the next round of testing.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 30 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.